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The parable of the Good Samaritan is a story of legal interpretation.
As the story goes, a lawyer ask§ for the precise requirements for getting
into heaven. The lawyer begins by setting out a supposedly established
contractual principle: a person may enter heaven if he loves his neighbor
as he would himself. The lawyer contends that this principle suffers
from ambiguous language and asks for guidance in fleshing out the
definition of "neighbor." Jesus answers the lawyer's request with the
account of the Good Samaritan.! Unlike other passersby, the Good
Samaritan comes to the aid of an injured stranger on the road, tending to
the stranger's wounds and paying for his convalescence at a local inn.2
The Samaritan's charity is all the more impressive because the stranger
is a member of a rival religious sect.' After hearing the story, the lawyer
realizes that the term "neighbor" is meant to be interpreted very broadly.
* Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. Thanks to Lindsay
Bernstein for her valuable research assistance.
1. Luke 10:25-37.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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Despite the parable's legal bent, Anglo-American law has been
reluctant to impose a legal duty on individuals to aid or protect others.
While our legal system may be sympathetic to moral teachings like the
story of the Good Samaritan, a countervailing concern, the need to
safeguard individual autonomy, has largely blocked imposition of such a
duty. Tort law teaches that, barring unique circumstances, individuals
are under no obligation to assist their fellow man, even when their
failure to act may result in death.4
Nevertheless, under certain conditions, courts will force us to
embrace the better angels of our nature or face legal consequences. This
Essay examines those conditions to assess whether they should have any
bearing in setting the boundaries of contributory infringement law.
More specifically, this Essay explores the situations where a defendant is
obligated to protect others by controlling the tortious behavior of third
parties. The rules establishing a duty to control another party are
germane to commercial intermediaries who can face liability from the
infringing acts of others. Should a duty be placed on providers of online
services to control the actions of others for the benefit of intellectual
property rights holders? For common law tort, such a duty arises only
when a "special relationship" exists between the defendant and some
other party, either the victim or the perpetrator, of the tortious act.5 I
contend that it only makes sense to recognize a special relationship
between online service providers and their infringing clients under a
very limited set of conditions.
Part I of this Essay describes existing contributory infringement
doctrine. Part II examines the circumstances in tort law where courts
have found that the relationship between the defendant and the direct
actor justifies imposition of a duty to control the latter. Interestingly, the
ability to manage the actions of the direct actor is not the only
4. Matin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence of a Duty to Reasonably Rescue in
American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1447, 1452 (2008). A few jurisdictions have enacted their
own "Good Samaritan" laws. Joel Jay Finer, Toward Guidelines for Compelling Cesarean Surgery:
Of Rights, Responsibility, and Decisional Authenticity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 239, 257 n.100 (1991)
(noting that "Good Samaritan" laws, while rare, exist in various states). But these laws typically
only exempt actors from liability for their efforts to assist rather than creating a duty to come to the
aid of another. See W. PAGE KEATON, PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 375
n.21 (5th ed. 1984) (identifying only three states that impose a duty, under certain limited
conditions, to rescue another in peril); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (setting out a safe harbor under
the subheading "Protection for 'Good Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material" for
Internet service providers that, in good faith, restrict access to indecent materials).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1977).
2
Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 3 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss1/1
CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGERS AND GOOD SAMARITANS
requirement for imposing such a duty. Part III applies these findings
from tort law to the specialized context of intellectual property.
I. PLACING CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT DOCTRINE IN THE CONTEXT
OF TORT LAW
All three of the main intellectual property regimes recognize the
doctrine of contributory infringement. Under current doctrine, to be
contributorily liable, the defendant must satisfy two criteria.6 First, the
defendant must have actual or constructive knowledge that her actions
are likely to facilitate infringement by another.7 Second, the defendant's
actions must materially contribute to the infringement.8
The Supreme Court has consistently located contributory
infringement doctrine within the jurisprudence of common law tort.9
Despite the absence of clear statutory authorization in the Copyright Act,
the Court justified imposition of contributory liability for copyright
infringement on the doctrine's prevalence in other legal realms.' °
Similarly, the Court approved contributory liability for trademark
infringement based on common law principles of unfair competition. 1
In the 2005 Grokster case, the Court cited a tort law treatise to bolster its
decision to create a new "inducement" form of indirect liability for
copyright infringement.12 Responding to this authority, the lower courts
have recognized indirect liability for patent, copyright, and trademark
6. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971).
7. See id.
8. See id. A separate doctrine, vicarious liability, provides an alternate route for imposing
liability on one party for the infringing conduct of another. The key difference between the two
secondary liability theories is that vicarious liability is based solely on the relationship between the
defendant and the direct infringer while contributory liability is based on the actions of the
defendant as well as the defendant's state of mind in relation to the underlying infringement.
Contributory infringement and vicarious infringement are discrete doctrines with differing
theoretical justifications. 5 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PARRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:41 (2008). A
discussion of vicarious liability is beyond the scope of this paper.
9. See generally MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005).
10. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,434-35 (1984).
11. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2 (1982) (White, J.,
concurring).
12. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936. Inducement infringement holds responsible parties that
encourage and specifically intend for the direct infringer to infringe. Id. at 919. All three of the
main intellectual property regimes recognize some form of inducement infringement. See Charles
W. Adams, Indirect Infringement from a Tort Law Perspective, 42 U. RICH. L. REv. 635, 636
(2007). The key difference between standard contributory infringement and inducement
infringement is that the latter requires "clear expression" of the defendant's intent to cause others to
infringe. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919.
2009]
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infringement and sometimes used common law tort jurisprudence as a
talisman to ward off criticism of their indirect infringement decisions.'
3
However, when the specifics of modem indirect infringement case
law are scrutinized, it is not clear that they owe much to tort law
precedent. Instead, prudential concerns often provide the justification
for contributory infringement decisions. Particularly in the case of
online intermediaries, courts present contributory liability, not as the
ineluctable result of established doctrine, but as a necessary weapon in
the battle against direct infringers. 14  For example, in the Grokster
decision, the Court started from the premise that mass online
infringement threatened the holders of music and movie copyrights, and
then worked backwards to articulate a new theory of contributory
liability that would ensnare the developers of what it deemed to be a
dangerous new technology.' 5 The Ninth Circuit adopted a similar
solution-oriented approach in imposing liability on the Google search
engine for providing the means for consumers to seek out and locate
infringing websites.16 Even when finding in favor of the contributory
defendant, courts tend to have one eye focused on the projected impact
of their decision on economic incentives and consumer behavior.
It is not clear that this is the best approach to adjudicating
contributory infringement cases, which are often disputes between
traditional intellectual property rights holders and technological
pioneers. As several scholars have already commented, it is impossible
to determine ex ante the precise economic effects of calibrating
13. E.g., Hard Rock Caf& Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148
(7th Cir. 1992) ("To answer questions of this sort, we have treated trademark infringement as a
species of tort and have turned to the common law to guide our inquiry into the appropriate
boundaries of liability."); Demetriades v. Kaufmnann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(contending that "copyright is analogous to a species of tort" and that vicarious and contributory
liability in tort are "well-established precepts"); Transdermal Prods., Inc. v. Performance Contract
Packaging, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 551, 553 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (explaining that contributory trademark
infringement theory grew out of the common law).
14. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929-30; In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645-46
(7th Cir. 2003); Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
15. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929 ("The argument for imposing indirect liability in this case is,
however, a powerful one, given the number of infringing downloads that occur every day using
StreamCast's and Grokster's software."); see also Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The
Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: The Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and
Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1409-10 (2006) (criticizing the prudentialist
reasoning of the Grokster decision).
16. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701,728-29 (9th Cir. 2007).
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contributory infringement law in one way or another.' 7 A technology
that appears to threaten the incentives for intellectual property creation
today may prove benign when examined years in the future. I"
In light of the unreliability of this prudential approach to secondary
infringement, it may be time to turn to a more in-depth analysis of tort
law principles to help determine the boundaries of contributory
infringement doctrine. The most natural source for guidance is the law
of civil aiding and abetting. Aiding and abetting law parallels
contributory infringement law as both doctrines require proof of a
certain level of knowledge of the underlying illegal activity and a
contribution to that activity by the contributory defendant. 19  The
problem is that the law of aiding and abetting remains notoriously
unsettled.20 Despite agreement that a successful plaintiff must establish
that the defendant had knowledge of the direct actor's wrongful conduct
and that the defendant substantially participated in the underlying tort,
"[g]eneral confusion has surrounded the question of what exact test
courts should use to determine liability.' Uncertainty exists as to the
boundaries of the knowledge inquiry.22 Likewise, confusion exists as to
how to define the "substantial participation" necessary for aiding and
abetting. 3 In addition, the rules of aiding and abetting liability can
change depending on jurisdiction,24 the type of party involved,25 and the
underlying tort at issue.26
17. See, e.g., George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual
Property: Comment on Cheung, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF
PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 21, 21-23 (John Palmer ed., 1986).
18. See Tim Wu, The Copyright Paradox: Understanding Grokster, 2005 SuP. CT. REv. 229,
254 (2005) (discussing the Court's past reluctance to impose liability on new technologies like the
record and the piano player given the Court's admitted inability to forecast the economic future).
19. Nathan Isaac Combs, Note, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 VAND. L. REv. 241,
275 (2005) ("The fundamental basis for aiding and abetting liability is that the defendant both (1)
knows of the primary actor's wrongful conduct; and (2) substantially assists or encourages the
primary wrongdoer to so act."); see also In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & "ERISA"
Litigation, 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 802 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
20. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C. Cit. 1983); AT&T v. Winback, 42 F.2d
1421, 1430 (3d Cir. 1994) ("And in fact, aiding and abetting liability is not a well-settled
mechanism for imposing civil liability.").
21. Combs, supra note 19, at 254-55.
22. Id at 265-67, 283. See also Laura A. Heymann, Knowing How to Know: Secondary
Liability for Speech, (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (describing the inconsistent
manner in which courts have applied the knowledge standard for contributory infringement).
23. Combs, supra note 19, at 293 ("the confusion begins when one attempts to apply the
principles of the substantial factor test to the theory of civil aiding and abetting").
24. See generally Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 96-97 (5th Cir. 1975)
(reviewing cases from different jurisdictions that do and do not accept silence and inaction as a
basis for aiding and abetting liability).
2009]
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Given all of these uncertainties, the Supreme Court's directive to
lower courts to evaluate contributory infringement in light of "rules of
fault-based liability derived from the common law" is ambiguous at
best.27 A schizophrenic body of aiding and abetting law offers no clear
answer to the riddles of contributory infringement. Yet a separate but
related area of tort doctrine may provide some guidance. In certain
specified circumstances, tort law recognizes a duty to protect third
parties from the actions of others. Like aiding and abetting, the law
regards breach of the duty to protect third parties from others'
misconduct as a distinct legal violation and not derivative of the direct
actor's tort.28 The interesting question is when should such a duty be
recognized? To a large degree, courts wrestling with contributory
infringement claims are asking the same question. When liability is
imposed, contributory infringement law obligates intellectual property
intermediaries to police the infringing activities of others. In charting
the boundaries of contributory infringement, it makes sense to consult a
well-developed body of tort jurisprudence that has already engaged in
some of the hard thinking about when it makes sense to burden someone
with the obligation to prevent illegal conduct by others. The next part
describes the reasons common law courts have offered for imposing a
duty to control others. Part III asks whether these reasons are applicable
in the specialized world of intellectual property infringement,
particularly in the online context.
II. TORT LAW'S REASONS FOR IMPOSING THE DUTY TO CONTROL ON
OTHERS
The general rule in tort law is that there is no duty to act for the
protection of others. 29 There are two exceptions to the rule, however.
First, there is a duty to render aid or protection when there is a particular
sort of relationship between the defendant and the victim of the tortious
25. E.g., Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062, 1071-72 (Or. 2006) (en banc) (recognizing
qualified privilege for lawyers assisting in a client's breach of fiduciary duty to a third party).
26. For example, courts in Georgia, Maine, Montana, and Virginia refuse to recognize a cause
of action for aiding and abetting fraud. Richard C. Mason, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting,
61 Bus. LAW 1135, 1140 (2006).
27. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,934-35 (2005).
28. Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Mason,
supra note 26, at 1139.
29. Richards v. Stanley, 271 P.2d 23, 27 (Cal. 1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
315 (1977).
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conduct.30 The Restatement of Torts recognizes five categories of
relationships between a defendant and victim that trigger a duty of
31affirmative action. In all of these relationships, the former party
maintains some sort of physical or economic power over the latter party.
When the latter party is threatened with harm in the context of this
relationship, the former party has a duty to take reasonable action to
prevent such harm from occurring. For example, when a police officer
places a suspect in handcuffs, the officer has a duty to protect the
vulnerable suspect from assault by another.32 Such an obligation is
justified under the notion that the victim's ability to protect himself is
compromised by virtue of this relationship while the defendant is in a
superior position to prevent harm from occurring.
3 3
This exception probably has little bearing in the intellectual
property context. Secondary infringement law is a hot topic today
because of potential liability for online intermediaries.34  These
intermediaries typically have no ongoing relationship with the
intellectual property rights holders who contend that they are victims of
infringement. Unlike a police officer and her prisoner or a mental
hospital and its wards, internet intermediaries do not maintain financial
or physical dominion over the intellectual property rights holders
plagued by online infringement. For example, in a recent much
discussed case involving contributory trademark infringement, an online
auction site made possible the illegal activity of counterfeiters, who used
the famous Tiffany mark to sell their own knockoff jewelry. Although
the court found in favor of the auction house for different reasons, the
auction house had no preexisting relationship with Tiffany, and thus,
could not be deemed to have a duty to protect the jeweler's interests by
virtue of a special relationship.35
The second exception however, does resemble the experience of
many online intermediaries. A duty to act affirmatively to prevent harm
to another also arises when a "special relationship" exists between the
30. Id.
31. The five categories are: (I) carrier-passenger; (2) innkeeper-guest; (3) landowner-invitee;
(4) custodian-ward; and (5) employer-employee. DAN C. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 857 (2000)
32. See Jackson v. City of Kansas City, 947 P.2d 31, 40-41 (Kan. 1997); see also Young v.
Huntsville Hosp., 595 So.2d 1386, 1388 (Ala. 1992) (hospital had duty to protect patient from
sexual assault by others while she was anesthetized).
33. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Defining the Duty of Religious Institutions to Protect
Others: Surgical Instruments, not Machetes, are Required, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 11, 25-26 (2005).
34. 5 PATRY, supra note 8, at § 21:55.
35. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Tiffany does not
sell or authorize the sale of Tiffany merchandise on eBay or other on line marketplaces.").
2009]
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defendant and the perpetrator of the harm.36 Even when such a special
relationship is recognized and a duty to control the perpetrator is
imposed, the defendant will only be liable when the tortious activity is
reasonably foreseeable.37 In the remainder of this Part, I discuss the
factors that courts rely on to decide if this special relationship exists. In
certain limited situations, the hallmarks of a "special relationship"-an
ability to control the actions of the tortfeasor, preservation of a sphere of
autonomy for the defendant even after imposition of the duty to control,
and evidence of the defendant's personal culpability-can be found in
the interactions between an intermediary and a direct infringer.
A. Control
The first element deemed necessary for recognition of a special
relationship between the defendant and the perpetrator is control over the
perpetrator's tortious activities.38 To trigger a duty to police the conduct
of the perpetrator, the defendant must have "taken charge" of the
perpetrator. 39  This can be measured in various ways. Formal legal
control over the defendant's activities will suffice. Thus, parole officers
can become responsible for the actions of their parolees when armed
with a court order conditioning parole on certain behavioral
requirements such as drug testing and attendance at counseling
sessions.4° Similarly, landlords, who typically have the authority to
prevent certain behaviors on their property, are deemed to have
sufficient control over their tenants.4' On the other hand, entities like
voluntary treatment facilities, colleges, and halfway houses are routinely
absolved from liability because they lack full physical custody and
sufficient legal authority over their charges.42
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1977).
37. See, e.g., Thomas v. City Lights Sch., Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 707, 710 (D.D.C. 2000) ("A
school's duty to supervise its students, however, is limited to a reasonable duty to guard against
foreseeable harm.").
38. Couch v. Wash. Dep't of Corr., 54 P.3d 197, 202 (Wash. App. 2002).
39. Id.
40. See Taggart v. State, 822 P.2d 243, 255-56 (Wash. 1992); Cole v. Indiana Dept. of Corr.,
616 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ind. App. 1993); see also King v. Durham County Mental Health, 439 S.E.2d
771, 774 (N.C. App. 1994) (holding that without a court order mandating participation in a
residential treatment program, defendant treatment facility did not have the necessary control for a
"special relationship" with a violent patient).
41. E.g., Parr v. McDade, 314 N.E.2d 768, 774-75 (ind. App. 1974); R.B.Z. v. Warwick Dev.
Co., 681 So.2d 566, 568 (Ala. App. 1996); Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condominiums, 941 P.2d 218,
220 (Ariz. 1997).
42. E.g., Rousey v. U.S., 115 F.3d 394, 399 (6th Cir. 1997); Bailor v. Salvation Army, 51
F.3d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 1995); Swanson v. Wabash Coll., 504 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. App. 1987).
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Sufficient control may also be based on more informal
understandings.43 The control element is satisfied when the court
determines that the relationship between the defendant and the
perpetrator matches a category of relationships where the perpetrator
will ordinarily comply with the defendant's wishes, even if they are not
legally mandated to do so. 4 If the relationship is one where the
defendant is normally expected to monitor the activities of the
perpetrator, a relationship of control is inferred.45 Thus, sufficient
control to trigger the duty exists in the case of a parent whose six-year-
old child is playing outside with a rifle. Because a minor is expected to
obey his parents, and parents are expected to monitor their children, if
the parent is aware of the child's activity and fails to take action, the
parent is liable to others for the child's gunplay.46  Although most
employers lack a sufficient amount of control over their employees for a
special relationship to be inferred, some courts have made an exception
for churches and the priests associated with them because of the
assumption that such organizations have greater influence over their
employees' lives. 47 On the other hand, a passenger in a car driven by its
owner will not be held responsible for the owner's reckless driving.48
The reason, suggests one thoughtful treatment of the subject, is that
social norms do not require one to obey or even acknowledge criticism
of one's driving from a non-owner passenger. We all know how
annoying backseat drivers are after all.49 Because we do not expect our
passengers to instruct us on how to drive, it would be unfair to impose
liability on passengers for the reckless behavior of their drivers.
Sufficient control for a special relationship will also be found when
the perpetrator uses an instrumentality knowingly provided by the
defendant to commit the harmful act. Section 318 of the Restatement of
Torts imposes liability when the defendant allows her chattels to be used
by a third person. 50 Thus, car owners can be held responsible for the
reckless driving of their vehicles by others.5' Likewise, a grocery store
43. Cf Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Mich. 1976) (finding a "special
relationship" between defendant and victim because they were "companions on a social venture").
44. Fowler V. Harper & Posey M. Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43
YALE L.J. 886, 891 (1934).
45. Id.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 316 cmt. b, illus. 1.
47. E.g., C.J.C. v. Corp. of Catholic Bishops of Yakima, 985 P.2d 262, 275 (Wash. 1999).
48. E.g., Olson v. lsche, 343 N.W.2d 284, 287 (Minn. 1984).
49. See Harper & Kime, supra note 44, at 891.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 (1977).
51. Smith v. Jones, 169 N.W.2d 308, 316 (Mich. 1969).
2009]
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may be liable for the misconduct of its patrons when the instrument of
their misconduct is one of its own shopping carts.52 The rationale for
imposing liability on the defendant in such a situation is that it is
assumed that one has control over her own property.
There are some qualifications to the rule imposing liability on
parties that own instrumentalities used wrongfully by others. The
defendant must know or should know that it has the ability to control the
tortfeasor's use of its chattel.53 In most cases, sufficient control will
only be inferred if the perpetrator uses the property in the defendant's
presence.54 Similarly, no special relationship exists if the defendant did
not have a reasonable opportunity to prevent the wrongful use of the
instrumentality. 55 Thus, the law only imposes a duty to control on those
actually in a position to stop the wrongful conduct.
Even if a court finds the required amount of control in the
defendant-perpetrator relationship, this is not sufficient to impose a duty
on the defendant.56 Two other elements must be satisfied before a duty
to control will be imposed. Broadly speaking, in addition to its control
analysis, a court will likely address the defendant's autonomy and
personal culpability. With respect to autonomy, a court will examine
how greatly the imposition of a duty to control will circumscribe the
defendant's freedom of action. Regarding culpability, the court will
look for signs of the defendant's personal blameworthiness, beyond the
evidence of its control over the tortfeasor.
B. Autonomy
Admittedly, autonomy and culpability are vague concepts that
could be subject to many potential meanings. Nevertheless, some rules
52. Meade v. Kings Supermarket-Orange, 366 A.2d 978, 979 (N.J. 1976); see also Cashnan
v. Reider's Stop-N-Shop Supermarket, 504 N.E.2d 487, 491 (Ohio App. 1986) (Parino, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 (1977).
54. Harper & Kime, supra note 44, at 888-89; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318
(1977) ("If the actor permits a third person to use land or chattels in his possession ... , he is, if
present, under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of the third person as to
prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them .... "); Knight v. Rower, 742 A.2d 1237, 1240-42 (Vt.
1999) (finding no social host liability for landowning parents who were not present when alcohol
was being served on their property).
55. Pulka v. Edelman, 358N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (N.Y. 1976).
56. John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About
the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 WiS. L. REV.
867, 888-89 & n.86; DOBBS, supra note 31, at 895.
10
Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 3 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss1/1
CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGERS AND GOOD SAMARITANS
of thumb can be gleaned from the case law regarding what types of
evidence satisfy these components of the special relationship
requirement. In a sense, the entire body of law that limits duties to act
for another's protection or benefit to "special relationships" is based on a
respect for individual autonomy. In large part, the need to preserve
individual freedom of action has trumped countervailing theories of a
moral duty to act.57 It is understandable that this concern with autonomy
remains a part of the special relationship analysis. Regarding the
defendant's autonomy interest, the court will evaluate the potential
number of parties that the defendant will be forced to regulate if a duty is
imposed. Even when the relationship at issue clearly demonstrates
sufficient control of the wrongful actor, courts will refuse to recognize a
duty that threatens to subject the defendant to unlimited or unduly
burdensome litigation. Thus, while landowners may have a duty to
control the wrongful behavior of others on their land, this duty is
typically only triggered when the wrongful actor is an invitee.58
Although it might be possible to take action to prevent even trespassers
from engaging in unlawful conduct on one's land, courts refuse to
require such precautionary measures, in part, because of the great burden
it would place on all landowners.59 Similarly, social hosts typically have
no responsibility for regulating the use of instrumentalities brought onto
their property by their guests. As one court explained, the problem with
imposing a duty to control such activity is that every host would be
exposed to considerable litigation for all sorts of conduct involving
usually benign items like fireworks, sporting equipment, and alcohol.6°
In performing this analysis of the burden resulting from such a duty
to control, courts not only examine the fiscal responsibilities such a duty
entails, but also "the more esoteric costs involved with requiring certain
actions to relieve potential liability.' '61 For example, autonomy interests
have been cited as a reason against imposing a duty on a pregnant
woman to avoid negligently harming her fetus. 62 Although such a duty
would not create crushing financial burdens for pregnant women, it
57. See Wendy E. Parmet, Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Public Health: Comments on
Lawrence 0. Gostin's Lecture, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1221, 1228 (2003); Richard Epstein, A Theory of
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 151, 198 (1973).
58. See Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Ave. Assoc., 802 P.2d 1360, 1367 (Wash. 1991).
59. Id. at 1369.
60. Luoni v. Berube, 729 N.E.2d 1108, 1112-13 (Mass. 2000).
61. Jupin v. Kask, 849 N.E.2d 829, 838-39 (Mass. 2006).
62. See Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E.2d 260, 263-64 (Mass. 2004); see also Chenault v.
Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474, 477-78 (Tex. App. 1999).
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would impose the "esoteric costs" courts consider, as such a duty would
implicate almost every action of a pregnant woman's daily life.63
In addition, the court will likely assess whether imposition of a duty
threatens to tarnish an important relationship between the defendant and
the tortfeasor. Thus, while some jurisdictions recognize a special
relationship between psychiatrists and their patients,64 others refuse to
impose a duty on psychiatrists because of concerns over destroying the
confidential environment needed for successful therapy.65 Similarly,
despite an obvious ability to control, courts have refused to find a special
relationship between military commanders and their personnel.66 The
case law suggests that relationships that require privacy and
confidentiality to flourish are not appropriate candidates for a duty to
control.
C. Culpability
Even if the control and autonomy elements are satisfied, a court
will be loathe to find a special relationship unless there are also indices
of the defendant's personal blameworthiness. One rule of thumb is that
unless the relationship involves physical custody over the perpetrator,
courts are reluctant to impose a duty on noneconomic relationships.67 In
other words, the controlling actor in a business relationship is more
likely to be deemed personally blameworthy than others. Thus, a
defendant had no responsibility for the conduct of her historically violent
on-again, off-again boyfriend when she invited another man to her
house.68 The court seemed to think that the longstanding noneconomic
social contact between the defendant and the boyfriend did not fit under
the category of "special relationships."69 In contrast, businesses are
routinely found liable for injuries to visitors from the conduct of third
persons on their property.70  The economic relationship between a
business and a tortious customer qualifies as a "special relationship," at
63. Jupin, 849 N.E.2d at 838-40.
64. E.g., Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Fain. Counseling Ct., 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1319 (Ohio
1997); Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 311 (Mo. App. 1995).
65. E.g., Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So.2d 446,448 (Fla. App. 1991).
66. E.g., Hallett v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 850 F. Supp. 874, 879 (D. Nev. 1994).
67. Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 33, at 25-26; Melissa Cassedy, Note, The Doctrine of
Lender Liability, 40 U. FLA. L. REv. 165, 175 (1988).
68. Fiala v. Rains, 519 N.W.2d 386, 389 (Iowa 1994).
69. Id.
70. Harper & Kine, supra note 44, at 903.
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least when the injury occurs on the business's premises. 71 When the
relationship between the defendant and the perpetrator is established to
enrich the defendant, a special relationship is likely to be inferred. To
some degree, this conforms to common expectations. We expect
business owners to keep us safe from other customers but we do not
usually expect one-half of a romantic duo to control the behavior of the
other.72
A court is also more likely to find a special relationship if the
defendant is responsible for creating and maintaining the entire
environment where the misconduct took place. It stands to reason that
someone who provides the arena for someone else to commit wrongful
conduct is more blameworthy than the person who provided more
limited assistance. Thus, while colleges and universities are usually
deemed to not have a special relationship with their students, courts will
impose a duty when the college owns and maintains the property where
the tortious activities took place.73 Similarly, innkeepers have a duty to
control unruly guests, and common carriers have a duty to control the
tortious behavior of their passengers.74 Moreover, some courts have
suggested that a defendant homeowner may be liable for a failure to
control a third party inside their home, even when she is not present
when the wrongful act takes place.75  Thus, although not explicitly
mentioned in the case law, it seems that courts are more likely to impose
the duty to control when the defendant has created the entire
environment where the misconduct occurs.
Finally, if the tortfeasor used an instrumentality of the defendant to
commit the wrongful act and the instrumentality is particularly
dangerous, then the court is more likely to view the defendant as
deserving of blame. Thus, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found a
special relationship between a mentally ill adult that shot a police officer
71. Id.
72. See Bauswell v. Mauzey, 936 F. Supp. 787, 789 (D. Kan. 1996) (babysitter not
responsible for sexual molestation of children by her husband); see also Cuppy v. Bunch, 214
N.W.2d 786, 788 (S.D. 1974) (one friend is not expected to control the inebriated conduct of
another friend).
73. See Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 520 (Del. 1991) (holding that university owed
legal duty to control students who injured another during a hazing ritual); cf Collete v. Tolleson
Unified Sch. Dist., 54 P.3d 823, 832 (Ariz. App. 2002) (holding that school had no duty to control
operation of its students' motor vehicles while off campus, even if the school had a closed campus
policy).
74. E.g., Corinaldi v. Columbia Courtyard, Inc., 873 A.2d 483, 490 (Md. Spec. App. 2005).
75. See, e.g., Chavez v. Torres, 991 P.2d 1, 6-7 (N.M. App. 1999).
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and the girlfriend of the adult's father.76 Because the girlfriend allowed
her boyfriend to house dangerous firearms in her home, the court found
that she had a duty to prevent her boyfriend's son from removing any of
the firearms. Key to the court's analysis, in a section of the opinion
entitled "public policy," was the recognition that "[a] firearm is a
dangerous instrumentality. 77 The dangerousness of the instrumentality,
the court explained, justified imposition of a duty to control others that
would not pertain in the case of more benign instruments.78 Similarly,
the Restatement cautions that "if the chattel is one which can be safely
used only if extreme caution is employed," then violation of a duty to
control may be found for anything less than the owner's "constant
vigilance" of third party users.79
III. APPLICATION TO CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
Contributory infringement law may be gravitating towards some of
the same considerations as courts evaluating the duty of a defendant to
control the tortious behavior of others.80 Courts already study the
amount of control the contributory defendant has over the direct
infringer. They also indirectly evaluate some of the autonomy and
culpability concerns referred to in Part II. Yet this evaluation is not
conducted in the same systematic way as decisions made regarding the
presence or absence of a "special relationship." In this Part, I examine
recent contributory infringement disputes under the template of "special
relationship" jurisprudence. The result is an approach to contributory
infringement that is slightly different than the current paradigm and that
would exempt most purveyors of online technologies.
A. Evidence of Control
If the tort doctrine described in Part II is applied in the context of
online intermediaries, in most cases, a special relationship would not
exist. Three elements comprise a special relationship within the
meaning of the Restatement. First, there must be a relationship of
control over the direct infringer. Second, imposition of the duty must
not overly restrict the defendant's autonomy. Third, there must be
76. Jupin v. Kask, 849 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Mass. 2006).
77. Id. at 838.
78. Id.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 cmt. c (1977).
80. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Palsgraf Principles of Tort Law, and the Persistent Need for
Common-Law Judgment in IP Infringement Cases, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. L.J. 21 (2009).
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evidence demonstrating the defendant's personal culpability. With
regard to the first element, a court would need to investigate the working
terms of the relationship between providers of Internet technologies and
their users to determine if the former has "taken charge" of the latter. At
first blush, the relationship between intermediaries and actual infringers
seems much less coercive than the relationship between parole officers
and parolees or other entities granted formal legal control over others.
Yet the contractual terms of agreements between certain online
intermediaries and their customers can be extremely one sided. Under
the terms of service required to participate in most virtual worlds or
social networking sites, the website developer has the right to monitor
for infringing content, and remove that infringing content without
notice.81 Similarly, sites relying on user-generated content like YouTube
ensure that they retain a license in user-contributed materials, including
the ability to reproduce, distribute, and prepare derivative works of
submitted videos.82 In assessing the presence of a special relationship,
what is key is determining whether the terms of a legal agreement or
court order provide the defendant with authority to control the specific
type of misconduct at issue.83 A court may conclude that agreements
between Internet entities and their users match this standard. Very often,
the terms of end-user license agreements specifically address the issue of
infringement. 84
Even if formal legal control over the infringer is not found,
sufficient control may be found based on the intermediary's actual
behavior. A technologist that engages in regular monitoring of its
client's activities demonstrates more control than one that does not
engage in such surveillance. Intermediaries accused of infringement
often do monitor their users' conduct. In fact, one might argue that such
monitoring by content organizers has come to be expected. On the other
hand, it is unclear whether there is a real social expectation that most
81. See Second Life Terms of Service Agreement, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php
(last visited February 23, 2009).
82. YouTube Terms of Use, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Jan 7, 2008).
83. Couch v. Wash. Dep't of Corr., 54 P.3d 197, 204 (Wash. App. Div. 2002) (holding that
insufficient control existed for a special relationship between a parolee and a parole office
supervising only the parolee's legal financial obligation).
84. See Britton Payne, Note, Super-Grokster: Untangling Secondary Liability, Comic Book
Heroes and the DMCA, and a Filtering Solution for Infringing Digital Creations, 16 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 939, 969-70 (2006) (describing EULA for City of Heroes);
Michelle Delio, Rude Awakening for File Sharers, http'//www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,60386,00.html (describing EULA for Kazaa software) (last visited Jan 7,2008).
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Internet intermediaries will exercise their discretion to alter their user's
conduct. For some, the appeal of the Internet is its lack of authority."
A key issue in determining whether the control element has been
satisfied will be whether the direct infringer uses an instrumentality to
infringe that has been provided by the defendant. The Restatement of
Torts recognizes a special relationship when the defendant's chattels or
instruments are used for tortious conduct with the defendant's
knowledge.8 6 As discussed above, many of the operative terms of
service for online games and social networking sites reveal that the
network developer already is aware of the potential for infringement.
This may suggest to a court that the website's capabilities for the
copying and distribution of intellectual property are instrumentalities
used to infringe with the website's knowledge.8 7  Under these
circumstances, a court might conclude that sufficient control exists
between the site owner and the direct infringer.88
On the other hand, another part of any analysis would be the real
capability of the defendant to prevent the infringing activity of the direct
infringer. If appropriate remedial action is not possible, then there
should be no liability for failure to control. Courts routinely reject
imposition of a duty to control when there was no real opportunity for
the defendant to control the tortfeasor's conduct.8 9 According to the
Restatement, in situations where an instrumentality of the defendant is
used tortiously by another, a duty to control may only be found when the
defendant is present while the instrumentality is used.90 Courts reason
that when a defendant is not physically present, it lacks the ability to
review use of its instrumentality and stop the tortious behavior. 91
Of course, most infringing intermediaries are not physically present
when the direct infringement occurs. Therefore, a rigid interpretation of
the presence requirement would preclude liability on the basis of
85. See Mark Bartholomew, Advertising in the Garden of Eden, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 737, 755
(2007) (discussing the anti-trademark protection ethos of virtual worlds).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 (1977).
87. See Candidus Dougherty & Greg Lastowka, Virtual Trademarks, 24 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 749, 826 (2008).
88. Jason C. Breen, YouTube or YouLose: Can YouTube Survive a Copyright Infringement
Lawsuit?, 16 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 151, 172 (2007).
89. E.g., Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn, 642 A.2d 219, 226-27 (Md. 1994) (no special
relationship between mental hospital and patient when plaintiff injures others after escaping from
hospital grounds); cf Meany v. Newell, 352 N.W.2d 779, 781(Minn. App. 1984) (even if accident
took place off premises, because consumption of alcohol took place on employer's premises,
employer had duty to control actions of employee).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 (1977).
91. See, e.g., Knight v. Rower, 742 A.2d 1237, 1243 (Vt. 1999).
16
Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 3 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss1/1
CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGERS AND GOOD SAMARITANS
providing an instrumentality used to infringe. The Restatement,
however, suggests that courts may adopt a broader view of this
requirement that does not demand the defendant's actual presence at the
scene of the misconduct. In a caveat to the section of the Restatement
involving the duties of land and chattel owners, the authors explain that
they express "no opinion as to whether there may not be a duty of
reasonable care to control the conduct of the third person . . where the
[defendant], although not present, is in the vicinity, is informed of the
necessity and opportunity of exercising such control, and can easily do
so." '92 Some courts have used this caveat to suggest that defendant
property owners may be liable for a failure to control a third party on
their property even when they are not present when the wrongful act
takes place.93 Thus, the defendant's failure to be physically present at
the moment of the tortious conduct does not necessarily preclude a
finding of a special relationship. It is an open question whether a
business's monitoring and surveillance of the infringer's online activities
renders the business in the "vicinity" of the infringing conduct, and
therefore part of a special relationship.
B. Autonomy and Culpability Concerns
With regard to the second element, a court would need to scrutinize
the impact of imposing a duty to control the direct infringer on the
intermediary's autonomy interests. Common law courts have
traditionally been wary of imposing a duty on relationships between the
defendant and tortfeasor that involve a need for confidentiality and
reciprocity. Such concerns seem unlikely when considering the situation
of indirect and direct infringers, however. Most contributory
infringement cases involve interactions between business entities and
their clients, a far different type of interaction than the social and
familial relationships that courts have been careful to preserve.
Another consideration would be the potential number of third
parties that the defendant would be obligated to control upon recognition
of a special relationship. A court would consider whether the defendant
is socially and economically positioned to manage such risk, or is
already sufficiently burdened with other responsibilities. In many cases,
the analysis might boil down to an assessment of the defendant's ability
to detect infringing conduct or to filter infringing content out of its
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 caveat (1977).
93. See, e.g., Chavez v. Torres, 991 P.2d 1, 6-7 (N.M. App. 1999).
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system. To some extent, courts already conduct such an analysis in
contributory infringement cases.94  What the special relationship
jurisprudence contributes is that a special relationship should never be
recognized between an intermediary and someone unknown to the
intermediary, or someone who only enjoys a transitory relationship with
the intermediary. Instead, the scope of the duty would need to be
confined to parties familiar with the defendant. This consideration
would impact different infringement intermediaries in different ways.
For many intermediaries, the direct infringer would be a client of theirs.
A typical business's duty to act upon knowledge of its clients'
preventable wrongdoing seems unlikely to jeopardize the business's
autonomy interests.95 But for businesses that rely on user generated
content, their relationship with the direct infringer is often fleeting at
best. For example, YouTube allows its users to upload content to its
site, copies the content into its own software, stores the content on its
own servers, and then allows the content to be accessed by the general
public, all with a minimum of interaction or identification of the user.96
As part of this procedure, videos that are longer than ten minutes are
screened out. In large part, this process is automatic, which results in
over one billion videos viewed per day.97 In such a situation, a
responsibility to supervise the conduct of content posters may prove too
taxing to the freedom that courts believe individual entities should
possess.
In addition to considering the defendant's autonomy interests, a
court would need to assess the metrics of personal blameworthiness. If
the relationship between the tortfeasor and the defendant is economic,
recognition of a special relationship is more likely. Common law courts
have already determined that noneconomic relationships must place the
perpetrator in the custodial control of the defendant before a duty to
protect others can be triggered. However, such formalized control is not
94. E.g., Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also A &
M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1095-96, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming shut-
down order where Napster "failed to prevent infringement of all of plaintiffs' noticed copyrighted
works" because "more could be done to maximize the effectiveness of the new filtering
mechanism").
95. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Rechanik, 249 F. Appx. 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding
software seller contributorily liable for "ostrich-like business practices" in purchasing counterfeit
software from customers and then reselling it without checking the software for authenticity).
96. Branwen Buckley, Suetube: Web 2.0 and Copyright Infringement, 31 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 235, 235-36 (2008).
97. Kevin J. Delaney, Google Push to Sell Ads on YouTube Hits Snags, WALL ST. J., July 9,
2008 at Al.
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required for interactions deemed economic. But to be deemed
economic, the defendant must directly profit off of the direct actor.
Merely using the direct actor to defray costs or as a conduit to other
parties that can provide necessary funds is insufficient.98 Given this
precedent, many Internet intermediaries would likely be absolved from a
duty to control infringers. In many cases, the intermediary does not
charge a fee for use of its online service, making its relationship with its
users not only somewhat attenuated but also not strictly economic. 99 For
example, entities may post infringing materials on YouTube for free.
Thus, for YouTube and other websites featuring user-generated content,
their relationship with the direct infringer would be deemed
noneconomic and less likely to be subject to a duty to control.
In looking for evidence of personal blame, courts also consider
whether the defendant was responsible for creating the total environment
where the tortious conduct by another could take place. Thus, another
part of the culpability calculation would be to determine whether the
contributory defendant put in place all of the necessary conditions for
another to infringe. In one sense, online intermediaries do provide the
entire arena where infringement occurs. Copyright infringement occurs
on YouTube because YouTube provides the means to upload protected
works and then distribute them to millions of potential viewers. Virtual
worlds like Second Life create virtual environs where someone else's
trademark can be copied, and then used commercially in a confusing
manner. On the other hand, one might argue that instead of providing
the environmental tools where infringement may take place, these
businesses actually only provide a service that real world users employ
in their own physical space to infringe. 10° Remember that the special
relationship jurisprudence holds that a duty to control will usually be
imposed when an instrumentality of the defendant is used by another to
commit a tort. Recognizing this rule, the Seventh Circuit has tried to
draw a distinction between a defendant's instrumentalities and its online
services, holding that control sufficient for a special relationship exists
only over uses of the former.' 0' If other courts agree with the Seventh
98. See Elizondo v. Ramirez, 753 N.E.2d 1123, 1130-31 (Il. App. 2001) (holding that
collection of small cover charge is insufficient to establish special relationship of business invitor
and invitee).
99. See Michael D. Main & Christopher V. Popov, Doe v. MySpace, Inc.: Liability for Third
Party Content on Social Networking Sites, 25 CoMM. LAW. 3, 5 (Spring 2007).
100. For two contrasting takes on the relevance of comparing cyberspace to real world
conditions, see Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REv. 521 (2003) and Richard
A. Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi: The Role of Self-Help in Cyberspace?, J. L. ECON & POLY. 147 (2005).
101. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2003).
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Circuit, then online service providers like Linden Labs, the makers of
Second Life, could not be viewed as providing the total environment for
infringement.
Another part of the culpability calculation would be to scrutinize
the "dangerousness" of the technology at issue. A benign or neutral
technology only rarely used for an infringing purpose would not
implicate a special relationship between the technologist and the direct
infringer. Most search engines would not enjoy a special relationship
with the direct infringer since search engines are used for mostly non-
infringing purposes. Nevertheless, one can envision some circumstances
where a technology becomes "notorious" as primarily a mechanism for
infringement and would be deemed a dangerous instrumentality by the
court. 0 2 Of course, to some degree, this begs the question as to how
much infringing activity there must be for a finding of "dangerousness."
A similar conundrum plagues current contributory infringement
jurisprudence as the Supreme Court has yet to provide a definition of
"substantial non-infringing use."103 Such values are difficult to quantify.
What the "dangerousness" metric provides is one factor among many
that a court can consider to determine if a duty should be imposed.
CONCLUSION
In evaluating the legal responsibility of indirect actors for
intellectual property infringement, courts, in effect, are deciding whether
to impose a duty to control the conduct of others. In a variety of
alternative contexts, common law courts have made a similar
determination. The general rule is that there is no duty to prevent
tortious behavior by another. When a "special relationship" exists
between the defendant and the direct tortfeasor, however, a duty to adopt
reasonable strategies to control foreseeable illegal conduct is triggered.
Although a "special relationship" analysis of potential contributory
infringers leaves many questions, it does offer a new way to evaluate
contributory liability that relies on an impressive body of past case law,
providing additional legal content where it has been sorely needed.
Courts need to be cautious in inferring such special relationships in
the interactions between direct infringers and their intermediaries. Some
businesses may truly guide the actions of direct infringers, leaving them
little discretion in their misdeeds. Others, however, particularly in the
102. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,924 (2005).
103. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,442 (1984).
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online context, provide standardized functionality that can be used as the
potential infringer sees fit. Imposing a duty to control on such actors
contradicts traditional notions of responsibility. In most cases, these
entities should not be held contributorily liable for the infringement of
others. Online intermediaries make tempting targets for infringement
suits given their deep financial resources, but imposing a duty on every
such intermediary, regardless of the nature of its involvement with the
direct infringer, would threaten the survival of nascent technologies and
their ability to promote beneficial social change. As one important
twentieth century figure recognized: "No one would remember the Good
Samaritan if he'd only had good intentions-he had money as well."'1 4
104. Interview by Brian Walden with Margaret Thatcher, in London, England (Jan. 6, 1980).
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